Topic 1. Agencies’ Ratings Vs. Internal Credit Rating Systems
Topic 2. Altman's Z-Score
Topic 3. Historical Default Probabilities
Topic 4. Borrowing Rating vs. Probability of Default
Topic 5. Hazard Rates
Topic 6. Recovery Rates
Agencies Ratings:
Public Availability: Credit rating agencies assign ratings primarily to large, publicly traded bond issuers, and these ratings are available to the general public.
Indicator of Credit Quality: Agency ratings signal the overall creditworthiness of an issuer and may change when new positive or negative information becomes available in the market.
Long-Term Perspective: Rating agencies focus on long-term creditworthiness, often rating issuers through an economic cycle rather than reacting to short-term fluctuations.
Rating Stability: Agencies aim to avoid frequent rating changes, ensuring stability and preventing unnecessary volatility in financial markets.
Coverage Limitations: Small and mid-sized firms are often not rated by external rating agencies due to limited public information or lower market relevance.
Internal Credit Rating Systems:
Unrated Borrowers: Financial institutions develop internal rating frameworks to assess the credit risk of unrated borrowers.
Key Financial Metrics Used Internally: Internal systems typically evaluate:
Profitability: Return on Equity (ROE)
Liquidity: Quick Ratio
Solvency: Debt-to-Equity Ratio
Cash Flow Focus: Lenders often adjust company financial statements to derive cash flow statements, which are critical for evaluating a borrower’s ability to repay debt obligations.
Formula: Z=1.2X1+1.4X2+3.3X3+0.6X4+0.999X5
Input Variables: The variables (X1 to X5) are a set of five key financial ratios.
Z-Score > 3: No default is likely.
2.7 - 3: Potential default.
1.8 - 2.7: Reasonable probability of default.
< 1.8: High likelihood of default.
Conclusion: A higher Z-score indicates a higher probability of being solvent, while a lower score suggests a higher risk of insolvency.
Q1. The following financial data pertains to Nielsen Corp. (Nielsen):
The Altman’s Z-score equation is as follows:
When using the computed Z-score to classify Nielsen based on credit quality, what is the most appropriate classification for the company?
A. No default is likely.
B. Potential default.
C. Reasonable probability of default.
D. High likelihood of default.
Explanation: C is correct.
The five financial ratios for computing Altman’s Z-score are as follows:
1. X1: working capital/total assets = 525,000 / 5,100,000
2. X2: retained earnings/total assets = 1,120,000 / 5,100,000
3. X3: earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)/total assets = 480,000/5,100,000
4. X4: market value of equity/book value of total liabilities = 4,215,000/1,850,000
5. X5: sales / total assets = 1,760,000 / 5,100,000
Altman’s Z-score is then as follows:
Z = 1.2 × (525,000 / 5,100,000) + 1.4 × (1,120,000 / 5,100,000) + 3.3 × (480,000 / 5,100,000) + 0.6 × (4,215,000 / 1,850,000) + 0.999 × (1,760,000 / 5,100,000)
= 0.1235 + 0.3075 + 0.3106 + 1.3670 + 0.3448 = 2.4534
The following guidelines apply for assessing credit quality:
> 3: no default is likely
2.7-3: potential default
1.8-2.7: reasonable probability of default
< 1.8: high likelihood of default
Therefore, with a Z-score of 2.4534, Nielsen has a reasonable probability of default.
Investment-grade bonds are rated AAA to BBB, while non-investment-grade ("junk") bonds are BB to D.
Example (AA-rated bond): The marginal probability of defaulting in Year 3 is the cumulative probability at the end of Year 3 minus the cumulative probability at the end of Year 2 = 0.11%−0.06%=0.05%.
Q2. The following information is an excerpt from a rating migration matrix for a B-rated bond:
What is the probability that the bond will default during the fourth year conditional on no earlier default?
A. 2.46%.
B. 2.79%.
C. 3.14%.
D. 3.56%.
Explanation: D is correct.
The probability of a B-rated bond defaulting in the fourth year is 14.89% - 11.75%= 3.14%.
The probability that the bond will survive until the end of the third year is 100%- 11.75% = 88.25%.
Thus, the probability that the bond will default during the fourth year conditional on no earlier default is computed as 3.14% / 88.25% = 3.56%.
Calculation: Conditional default probability = (Unconditional default probability) / (Probability of no earlier default).
Example: For a BB-rated bond in Year 4, the unconditional default probability is 1.53%. The probability of no earlier default (by the end of Year 3) is 100% - 3.46% = 96.54%.
The conditional default probability (hazard rate) is 1.53%/96.54%=1.58%.
Formula: The probability of default by time t can be approximated with the average hazard rate (λ(t)):
From Fig 27.1, the unconditional default probability for BB-rated bond in Year 4 (from a Year 0 perspective) is 1.53% (= 4.99% - 3.46%).
The probability that the BB-rated bond remains in place until the end of Year 3 is 96.54% (= 100% - 3.46%).
Conditional default probability: Probability that the bond will default in Year T, conditional on no earlier default. The conditional default probability that the bond will default in Year 4 is: 1.58% (= 1.53% / 96.54%).
Hazard rate: If one year is considered a sufficiently short amount of time, then the conditional default probability could also be called the hazard rate of default intensity.
Formula for probability of default by time t:
Assuming a constant hazard rate of 2% per year,
The probability of default by the end of Year 1 (t = 1)
The probability of default by the end of Year 2 (t = 1)
Therefore, the unconditional probability of default during Year 2 = 3.92%-1.98%=2.94%
Also, the conditional probability of default in Year 5, conditional on no earlier default, is:
2.94%/(1-1.98%)=2.99%
Recovery rates on debt are typically negatively correlated with default rates. For example, in mortgage markets, higher default rates lead to more foreclosures and increased housing supply, which pushes property prices downward and ultimately reduces the lender’s recovery value on the collateral.
In a strong economic environment, bond default rates are generally low, and when defaults occur, recovery rates tend to be higher due to better asset values and stronger market conditions.
In contrast, during a weak economic environment, bond defaults increase, and the average recovery rate declines because distressed assets lose value and liquidity becomes limited.
This creates a negative correlation between default rates and recovery rates, which is particularly challenging for lenders in downturns since they face both higher default frequency and lower recoveries simultaneously.
Example (Mortgages): Higher mortgage default rates lead to more foreclosures and a surplus of properties on the market, which in turn drives down property prices and reduces the lender's recovery rate.
Topic 1. CDS and its Mechanics
Topic 2. Credit Indices
Topic 3. Fixed Coupons
Topic 4. CDS Spreads
Topic 5. CDS-Bond Basis
Topic 6. Approximating Hazard Rates
Topic 7. Most Precise Hazard Rates
Cash Settlement: Dealers are surveyed to determine the mid-point between bid and ask prices of the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) bond. The cash payoff is then the difference between the face value and the market value of the bond.
Default:
Physical Settlement: If ELF defaults (e.g., Jul 20, 2028), MM pays $200 million (notional) to FIA and receives the ELF bonds, which must come from a predefined list of eligible deliverable bonds.
Cash Settlement: the payoff is based on the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) bond price determined by dealer quotes; if the CTD bond trades at $0.40 per dollar of face value, FIA receives 60% of notional ($120 million).
Q1. The five-year CDX NA IG Index (125 companies) is quoted as bid 141 bps and ask 143 bps. An investor plans to sell $1 million of protection on each company. At the beginning of the third year before the annual protecon payment, one of the companies defaults. Assuming no other defaults, the investor’s cash flow for the third year is closest to:
A. $748,400 inflow.
B. $748,400 outflow.
C. $773,200 inflow.
D. $773,200 outflow.
Explanation: A is correct.
The investor will sell CDS protection on the 125 companies in the index for 140 bps per company. The annual receipt by the seller is 0.0141 × $1,000,000 × 125 = $1,762,500. However, because one company defaulted before the protection payment, the annual receipt by the CDS seller will be reduced by $1,762,500 / 125 = $14,100. In addition, the seller will have to pay $1 million to the CDS protection
buyer as a result of the default. The CDS seller’s cash inflow for the year is computed as $1,762,500 - $14,100 - $1,000,000 = $748,400.
CDS spread = fixed coupon: No up-front premium is paid.
CDS spread > fixed coupon: The protection buyer pays an up-front premium equal to the present value of (CDS spread - fixed coupon).
CDS spread < fixed coupon: The protection seller pays an up-front premium to the protection buyer, equal to the present value of (fixed coupon - CDS spread).
CDS spread < bond yield spread: Buy the corporate bond and buy CDS protection to earn more than the risk-free rate.
CDS spread > bond yield spread: Sell the corporate bond and sell CDS protection to borrow at less than the risk-free rate.
Example: A 5-year corporate bond yielding 6% can be hedged by purchasing a 5-year CDS with a spread of 1.5%, transferring the credit risk to the CDS seller.
After paying the CDS premium, the net return becomes 4.5% (6% − 1.5%), which effectively represents the implied risk-free return if the bond does not default.
If a default occurs, the investor earns 4.5% until default, and the CDS payoff compensates the loss by returning the bond’s face value, which can then be reinvested at the risk-free rate for the remaining period.
Q2. In the context of arbitrage trades, if the CDS spread is significantly greater than the bond yield spread, what is the most appropriate action by the investor?
A. Buy the corporate bond and buy CDS protection.
B. Buy the corporate bond and sell CDS protection.
C. Sell the corporate bond and buy CDS protection.
D. Sell the corporate bond and sell CDS protection.
Explanation: D is correct.
If the CDS spread is greater than the bond yield spread, sell the corporate bond, and sell CDS protection to borrow at less than the risk-free rate.
Bonds trading significantly above or below par
Counterparty risk in CDS contracts (negative basis)
The possibility of a CTD bond in a CDS (positive basis)
CDS payoffs excluding accrued interest (negative basis)
Restructuring clauses in CDS contracts allowing for payoffs, even without default (positive basis)
The bond yield spread is computed using a risk-free rate that is dissimilar to the one used by the market
Illiquidity, which prevents full exploitation of arbitrage opportunities.
s(T) is the credit spread for maturity T and RR is the recovery rate.
Example: With a 5-year credit spread of 210 bps (2.1%) and a recovery rate of 30%, the average annual hazard rate is 0.021/(1−0.3)=3%.
Bootstrapping a Term Structure: This method can be used to determine a term structure of hazard rates from credit spreads for different maturities.
For a 3-year spread of 80 bps and a 65% recovery rate, the average 3-year hazard rate is 0.008/(1−0.65)=2.29%.
For a 5-year spread of 90 bps and 65% recovery, the average 5-year hazard rate is 0.009/(1−0.65)=2.57%.
The average hazard rate between Year 3 and Year 5 is then [(5×0.0257)−(3×0.0229)]/2=2.99%.
The average hazard rate between Year 5 and Year 10 is: [(10×0.0314)−(5×0.0257)]/2=3.71%.
A comparable risk-free government bond with the same coupon structure but a 5% continuously compounded yield is priced higher at 104.09.
The difference in prices arises because the risky bond incorporates credit risk and the possibility of default, while the government bond is assumed to be default-free.
The price gap of 8.75 (104.09 − 95.34) represents the market’s estimate of the expected loss due to default over the 5-year life of the corporate bond.
Fig 27.4 shows the computation of the PV of expected loss assuming that bond defaults can occur only at five specified points in time, each immediately before scheduled coupon payment dates. A constant default probability QQQ is assumed throughout the bond’s life, with a fixed RR of 40% applied to the bond value in the event of default.
The expected value of a default-free bond at t = 4.5 years is 103.46, calculated as:
With RR as 40% of the face value, LGD is 63.46 (= 103.46 - 40), and on a discounted basis using a 5% annual discount rate, the loss is 50.67 and the expected loss is 50.67Q.
From Fig 27.4, the total expected loss for all the periods is 288.48Q. Given the 8.75 amount computed earlier, the default probability (Q) = 8.75/288.48 = 3.03%.
Using a sample of bonds maturing in 2, 5, and 7 years, a bootstrapping process could be used for estimating the term structure of default probabilities.
the 2-year bond could be used to estimate the default probability for the first two years,
the 5-year bond to estimate the annual default probabilities for Years 4 and 5,
the 7-year bond to estimate the annual default probabilities for Years 6 and 7.
Topic 1. Default Probabilities Estimation
Topic 2. Real-World vs. Risk-Neutral Default Probabilities
Topic 3. Default Probability Using Merton Model
Topic 4. Merton Model Performance
Fig 27.5 provides the 7-year average cumulative default probabilities for issuers of varying credit ratings (from S&P in Column 1) and the 7-year credit spread for varying ratings (from Merrill Lynch in Column 2).
The values in Figure 27.5 can be used to estimate the average 7-year hazard rates using two calculation methods.
The first method applies the following equations:
Method 1: A BBB-rated issuer has a cumulative 7-year default rate of 2.27%, so the average hazard rate is calculated as:
Method 2: Using the same BBB-rated issuer as Method 1, but using the 7-year credit spread and a 40% recovery rate assumption, the average 7-year hazard rate is:
A summary of the average 7-year hazard rates is provided in Fig 27.6 for the full range of credit ratings using the same methodologies just discussed.
From Fig 27.6, hazard rates implied from credit spreads are significantly higher than those estimated from historical default data.
The gap between the two hazard rates is smaller for higher credit quality and larger for lower credit quality instruments, suggesting that credit spreads compensate investors more than the expected default losses.
The excess compensation becomes more pronounced for lower-rated instruments and during periods of economic stress with high spreads.
Bond defaults are influenced by economic conditions rather than being independent; strong economies tend to reduce default probabilities, while weak economies increase them.
Historical data shows large year-to-year variation in default rates, creating systematic (non-diversifiable) risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification.
Because lower-quality debt behaves similarly to equity in terms of risk, investors demand higher expected and excess returns as compensation for the additional risk.
Unlike equities, it is often difficult or impractical to fully diversify away unsystematic risk in a bond portfolio.
Investors may deliberately take on unsystematic credit risk because it can offer additional return through higher credit spreads.
Corporate bonds are generally less liquid than government bonds, so part of the higher credit spread compensates investors for liquidity risk.
Risk-neutral assumption: Expected asset growth equals the risk-free rate
Real-world assumption: Expected asset growth = risk-free rate + market risk premium
Impact on asset valuation: Higher expected growth in the real world leads to higher asset values
Effect on default probability: For the same debt face value, real-world default probability < risk-neutral default probability
Use-case distinction
Risk-neutral estimates suit valuation (e.g., credit spreads)
Real-world estimates suit scenario analysis (e.g., historical default data)
For this model, we assume that there is debt outstanding that needs to be repaid at time T.
V0V_0V0: Current value of the firm’s assets
VTV_TVT: Value of the firm’s assets at time TTT
D: Total debt due at time TTT
E0: Current value of the firm’s equity
ETE_TET: Equity value at time TTT, defined as max(VT−D,0)\max(V_T - D, 0)max(VT−D, 0)
σV\sigma_VσV: Volatility of firm asset value
σE\sigma_EσE: Volatility of equity value
ET=max(VT−D,0)E_T = \max(V_T - D, 0)ET=max(VT−D,0)
If VT>DV_T > DVT>D: firm services debt and equity retains positive value
If VT<DV_T < DVT<D: default is optimal since equity value becomes zero
With no dividends assumption, the Black-Scholes-Merton equity value today is:
Q1. A junior analyst is evaluating the following questions to include in her research report:
Regarding these questions, the analyst’s report should support which of the following conclusions?
Explanation: B is correct.
Risk-neutral default probabilities should be used in valuation, and real-world default probabilities should be used in scenario analysis. As the distance to default rises (falls), the company is less (more) likely to default.
Empirical studies show that the Merton, Moody’s-KMV, and Kamakura models produce reliable and accurate rankings of default probabilities.
The Merton model estimates risk-neutral default probabilities, derived from option pricing theory.
Moody’s-KMV and Kamakura transform Merton’s output into real-world (physical) default probabilities.